25X1

3 October 1962

BRIEFING MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: NRP

1. The satellite portion of the NRP consists of [redacted] photographic projects listed below. The aircraft program involves 1 photographic (U-2 - [redacted]) project in operation and the OXCART system under development. In addition [redacted] drone projects - [redacted] OXCART/TAGBOARD.

25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1

Satellite Reconnaissance Program

Project	Agency	Objective	Characteristic	Timing	Remarks
CORONA-M	CIA	Photo-Survey	App. 13' resolution	Present	Proven reliability
CORONA-M J mod.	CIA	Photo-Survey	Dual capsule recovery	Apr. '62	Relatively straight-forward
201	AF	Photo-Survey	App. 10' resolution	Near future	No success to date
LANYARD	AF-CIA	Photo-Tech. Intelligence	6' resolution	Mar. '62 (may slip)	Interim [redacted] tech. input. system
[redacted]					25X1
P-33	AF	Weather	Real time cloud cover	Present	Useful for programming photo systems
[redacted]					25X1
[redacted] location					

25X1

Copy No. 3

25X1

2. Within the satellite program the most controversial item involves the continuation of the 201 program. The 201 should give slightly bigger resolution, approximately in the ratio of 10' as compared with 13'. A COMOR-NPIC study of resolution required to cover priority targets indicates that this degree of improvement is probably of marginal value in that the present CORONA-M system is quite satisfactory for all survey purposes and neither system adequate for technical intelligence. The 201 system is capable of carrying twice the film footage of the present M so that in spite of the greater cost of the 201, it should be slightly cheaper on a dollar per square mile basis (approximately .6) per successful launch. However, the CORONA-M system is of proven reliability and even assuming quite optimistic learning curves for the 201 which has not had a success to date, it is unlikely that any economy could result from the 201 system until after 1966. The development of the J version of the CORONA-M system would double the film capacity and provide the very attractive feature of dual capsule return so that it is clearly superior to the 201 on every count other than the marginal difference in theoretical resolution.

3. In view of these factors, it is universally agreed that no long-term commitments should be made for the 201, and the only question that remains is whether the 201 should be cancelled out-right or whether a few of the systems which have already been procured (3 to 5) should be fired in order to determine how useful the system is and recoup some of the funds that have already been sunk into this program. If a decision is made to fire 3 and cancel the rest of the program now, this would involve the expenditure of about [redacted] However, if the decision on cancellation of the remaining 2 were held up until after the third firing, then the net cost would be [redacted] If the entire program was cancelled out-right, then [redacted] would be saved. It is my understanding that the technical gain from determining the effectiveness of the 201 camera system is somewhat marginal since it does not have much application to other systems under development. In view of this, I would recommend that the 201 be cancelled out-right and that the funds saved be put into other programs which have greater potential value. At the very most I believe that 3 additional flights should be authorized with the understanding that the decision to proceed would be reconsidered after each 201 launch.

25X1

25X1

25X1

Copy No. 2

[redacted] 25X1

[redacted] 25X1

5. The satellite ELINT program is a relatively modest but broad and useful program. It was prepared as a combined effort of NSA, AF, Navy and CIA personnel with [redacted] of our OEL doing a large share of the spade work. The Agency has no specific responsibility in this area other than to provide technical assistance and advice. We do feel that it is quite a reasonable program which is aimed primarily at obtaining intelligence on Soviet anti-ballistic missile systems and secondarily on radar as deployed deep in the Soviet interior. I recommend that you approve this program. 25X1

6. The three aircraft systems are all under CIA management, and I believe on the whole non-controversial. Development-wise the main effort in the IDEALIST program is to develop countermeasures and penetration aids so as to prolong the life of the U-2 with increasing deployment of SAM's throughout the world. The only major problem relative to the OXCART program involves the surfacing of the RB-X (Tab A) and the extraordinarily difficult problem of developing penetration techniques which will assure the safety and hopefully the lack of detection of the aircraft, thereby permitting a political decision to proceed with overflight of Soviet territory.

[redacted] 25X1

Copy No. 1

25X1

25X1

8. In addition to the specific collection systems, the NRO is responsible for processing the take. An arrangement has been worked out whereby the AF and CIA facilities at Eastman will be combined under CIA management and up-dated to process initially all of the high-quality material and prepare dupes for NPIC-community use. Additional large-scale production of dupes for other customers will be carried out by the AF facility at Westover. The CIA part of this effort is carried as a line item in its part of the NRO program and is reasonable in light of the anticipated requirements. NSA has the prime responsibility for analysis of the SIGINT take, but SAC is doing a fair share of this with NSA's concurrence. CIA has participated by providing technical guidance and assistance.

Signed Herbert Scoville, Jr.

HERBERT SCOVILLE, JR.
Deputy Director
(Research)

Attachments: (2)

25X1



Approved For Release 2005/04/22 : CIA-RDP85B00803R000100020005-7

11 August 1962

Memorandum of Understanding Regarding Chemical Processing and Reproduction of Photography from (TS) NRP Missions

1. This memorandum outlines general guidelines for use in the planning, programming, and management of the principal laboratory facilities for processing and duplicating photographic film resulting from missions under the direction of the (S) National Reconnaissance Office.

2. The principal laboratory facilities to be utilized for this purpose will be the covert capability established at the Eastman Kodak Company and the overt capability established at the AFSPPL facility on Westover Air Force Base, Massachusetts.

3. The two Eastman covert contract laboratories presently being supported separately by the CIA and the Air Force will be combined and consolidated. Supervision of the Eastman X Laboratory will be transferred from the Director of Special Projects, OSAF, to the Deputy Director (Research), CIA. The Eastman contract(s) and the AFSPPL facility charter will be changed as required to provide for appropriate utilization of both facilities to support all projects of the (TS) National Reconnaissance Program.

4. Management of all covert contracts of these facilities will be assigned to the CIA. Management of the AFSPPL facility will be assigned to the Director of Special Projects, OSAF. Operational control of all of the facilities will be retained by the (S) Director, National Reconnaissance Office, as outlined in paragraph 8 below.

5. The Eastman facilities will be utilized for processing all original negative material from all (TS) National Reconnaissance Program missions, plus such additional production as required in order to make the most efficient use of the Eastman-AFSPPL combination. The AFSPPL facility will be utilized to produce duplicates for distribution to users.

6. The Eastman contract(s) will provide for R&D of new techniques by the Eastman facilities and for full support of the AFSPPL facility by Eastman technical personnel, to include training of personnel in the Eastman facilities. 25X1

7. The present obsolete Eastman covert laboratory on Lincoln Avenue will be phased out as soon as possible and the work and appropriate personnel of this activity transferred to the covert Eastman X Laboratory in the Hawkeye Building. All future expansion of the capabilities of this laboratory will be based upon review of the combined capability of this and the AFSPPL to meet all (TS) National Reconnaissance Program production requirements. In this regard, the general orientation of the Eastman Laboratory will be based upon initial processing of the highest quality, together with limited production capability, rather than quantity production.

8. The (S) NRO staff will be responsible for coordinating the production activities and determining and assigning the production workloads of both the Eastman X Laboratory and the AFSPPL. The (S) NRO staff will carry out these tasks in such manner as to meet the priorities established by the USIB through the most efficient utilization of these combined facilities. In this regard, the (S) NRO staff will rely upon USIB to provide information regarding the relative priorities of the individual recipients or groups of recipients receiving duplicate positives and negatives from the various projects of the (TS) National Reconnaissance Program. The (S) NRO staff also will make arrangements for other government-owned laboratories to assist in the production of duplicate negatives or positives during periods of temporary overloading of Eastman and AFSPPL facilities.

9. Plans will be prepared for each (TS) NRP project by the responsible Program Director which will include descriptions of the method of handling film, from initial offloading from the collection vehicle to distribution to the customer. These plans will be prepared in conjunction with the (S) NRO staff and will include method of delivery of film to the processing facilities, the anticipated number of duplicates required, titling data to be used, the requirements for data block reading and distribution of supplemental information.

/s/ Joseph V. Charyk
DirectoR
National Reconnaissance
Office

CONCUR: *
/s/ Herbert Scoville, Jr. date: 11 Aug 1962

25X1

Endorsement to
Memorandum of Understanding
regarding
Chemical Processing and Reproduction of Photography
from (TS) NRP Missions

Concur, with the following clarifying remarks:

a. That the operational control discussed in Paragraph 4 is intended to be limited to those functions quoted in Paragraph 8 since it is believed that other management responsibility for the respective facilities should be vested in CIA and Director of Special Projects, OSAF.

b. Paragraph 5 should not be understood to eliminate processing of original negative material at certain overseas locations, [redacted] where tactical usage demands rapid processing. Likewise, it is deemed desirable that the duplicate positive and negative material furnished NPIC for rapid community exploitation should be processed at Eastman. It is agreed AFSPPL should quite appropriately produce the major portion of duplicate material required.

25X1

25X1

[redacted]